Seventh Circuit Revisits Teacher’s Name/Pronoun Usage Accommodation Claim Under Title VII

On August 5, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation, which examined a religious discrimination claim brought by a public school teacher that refused to utilize the preferred names and pronouns of students on religious grounds.  The decision is notable for employers given the Court’s application of a heightened legal standard recently established by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding an employer’s burden in responding to religious accommodation claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Factual Background

John Kluge (“Kluge”) was a teacher at Brownsburg High School (“Brownsburg”) outside of Indianapolis.  Kluge objected on religious grounds to Brownsburg’s policy which required teachers to call students by the first names and pronouns that were listed within the school’s database.  Brownsburg permitted students to change their names in the database after providing letters from a parent and a healthcare professional.  Kluge believed that calling transgender students names that conflicted with their biological sex encouraged transgender identities, which he asserted is prevented by his religion.  Initially, Kluge was granted a religious accommodation by Brownsburg which allowed him to refer to students by only their last names (“like a sports coach”). 

However, after a group of students, parents, and teachers complained about Kluge’s last-name-only practice, Brownsburg rescinded the accommodation, again requiring Kluge to call students by their first names.  The complaints received by school administration generally reflected that Kluge’s practice caused students to be offended and experience emotional distress and harm.  However, the Court made note that some of the evidence on the practice’s effect on the school was disputed.  In response to the revocation of his last-name-only accommodation, Kluge resigned from his position and then filed a Title VII lawsuit against Brownsburg, alleging that the school failed to accommodate his religion.

Procedural History

Under Title VII, an employer is required to accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of an employee unless providing such an accommodation imposes an “undue hardship” on its business.  When Kluge’s lawsuit was first litigated at the district court level, the applicable legal standard utilized by courts in reviewing undue hardship arguments was that an employer was not required to accommodate an employee’s religion if doing so imposed “more than a de minimis cost.”  Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).  In granting Brownsburg’s motion for summary judgment on Kluge’s claim, the district court concluded that this standard was met due to the complaints received reflecting that transgender students in Kluge’s class felt targeted and uncomfortable, and that other students and teachers felt Kluge’s behavior was insulting or offensive.  The district court also concurred with Brownsburg’s assertion that it would incur enhanced liability under Title IX if it continued to allow Kluge to refer to transgender students by last-name-only.  Kluge appealed the district court’s decision, which was initially affirmed by the Court based upon its conclusion that the last-name-only accommodation placed an undue hardship on the school’s mission.

After the Court issued its decision affirming summary judgment in favor of Brownsburg, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023), clarifying that, for Title VII religious accommodation claims, in order to establish undue hardship, an employer must demonstrate a burden that is “substantial in the overall context” of its business as opposed to only a “de minimis cost.”  Courts applying this new standard are required to consider the potential accommodation’s “practical impact in light of the nature, size and operating cost of [an] employer.”  Groff at 470-471.  Any impact of the accommodation, including effects on co-workers, must affect the overall business.  Groff at 472.  However, if the impact on co-workers arise only from the co-workers’ “dislike of religious practice and expression in the workplace or the mere fact [of] an accommodation,” those may not be considered.  Groff at 472.

In response to the Groff decision, the Court vacated its initial decision in favor of Brownsburg and remanded the case to the district court, directing the district court to apply the clarified standard to Kluge’s religious accommodation claim.  Even under Groff’s heightened standard, the district court again granted Brownsburg’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that (a) the school’s “business” was “educating all students,” which the school achieved by “foster[ing] a safe, inclusive environment for all students”; (b) two specific students were affected by Kluge’s accommodation and other students and teachers complained; and (c) the “emotional harm” was likely to be repeated each time a new transgender student joined Kluge’s class.  Taken together, the district court concluded that these factors established undue hardship as a matter of law.

The Decision

On appeal, the Court reviewed the underlying question as to whether the impacts caused by the accommodation given to Kluge rose to the level of an undue hardship under the more rigorous standard set forth within the Groff decision.  Reviewing the grant of Brownsburg’s summary judgment motion on appeal, which requires all facts to be construed in favor of Kluge and there to be no genuine dispute as to any material facts, the Court held that summary judgment in favor of Brownsburg was not appropriate given the existence of material factual disputes.

According to the Court, Brownsburg failed to produce undisputed facts demonstrating an “excessive” or “unjustifiable” hardship on its mission of “fostering a safe, inclusive learning environment for all.”  The Court noted the record did not conclusively show that any student’s safety was in jeopardy due to the accommodation provided to Kluge, and that it was not clear at this point in the litigation that the emotional distress suffered by the students was caused by the accommodation.  The Court stated that whether the accommodation was the cause of the students’ emotional distress is a question for the jury to decide. 

The Court also highlighted that in religious accommodation cases, employers must demonstrate an objective undue hardship on business, not one just subjectively perceived.  Here, the Court concluded that Brownsburg introduced no evidence to show that a teacher’s use of only a student’s last name resulted in emotional distress under an objective standard.  The Court noted that Brownsburg had similarly not met its burden to demonstrate undisputed facts that a serious disruption was caused to the learning environment by Kluge’s accommodation, which precluded summary judgment in favor of Brownsburg.

The Court acknowledged that Title VII does not obligate employers to accommodate an employee if doing so “would place it on the ‘razor’s edge’ of legal liability.”  However, in this case, the Court concluded that Brownsburg had not established the existence of differential (or worse) treatment of transgender students due to Kluge’s accommodation, which would have then placed the school on the “razor’s edge” of liability under Title IX.

In reversing summary judgment in favor of Brownsburg, the Court remanded Kluge’s religious discrimination claim to the district court for further proceeding.

Takeaways

The Court’s decision in Kluge does not stand for the proposition that the school was required to grant Kluge’s requested religious accommodation under Title VII.  Instead, the Court concluded that summary judgment in favor of the school was not appropriate given the existence of disputed material facts surrounding Kluge’s claim, which is to be decided at trial.  However, the Kluge decision highlights application of the heightened standard for Title VII religious accommodation claims consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent holding in Groff.  As such, employers should continue to carefully examine religious accommodation requests submitted by employees to ensure compliance with Title VII.

Please contact your Robbins Schwartz attorney with any questions regarding the impact of this decision on your employment policies or practices.