“Moral Conscience” Isn’t Enough for Religious Accommodation

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision clarifying the requirements of school employers related to the vaccinate or test requirements under Governor Pritzker’s executive orders during the COVID-19 pandemic. As many may recall, in September 2021, Governor Pritzker issued an Executive Order which included a requirement that school personnel receive the COVID-19 vaccination or be excluded from the premises. The Executive Order also allowed an employee to elect to be tested weekly rather than receive the vaccination if “vaccination would require the individual to violate or forego a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance.”

In Bowlin v. Bd. Of Dir., Judah Christian et al., three plaintiffs from three different schools filed claims against their respective employer school districts, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII. Each employee refused vaccination, citing religious beliefs, and each employer offered weekly testing as an accommodation. Plaintiffs refused weekly testing as well, alleging the mandate violated their moral consciences, and otherwise would not agree to any alternative accommodations in compliance with the Executive Order. As a result, each employee then separated from their employment. In 2022, they filed suit in federal district court alleging that the individual districts discriminated against them based on their religious beliefs.

Title VII prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an individual with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment because of the individual’s religious belief. Religion includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” The Seventh Circuit noted that a reasonable accommodation under Title VII does not impose a duty on the employer to accommodate at all costs, and instead is “one that ‘eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices.’” The Court further recognized that the accommodation does not have to be the employee’s preferred accommodation. The employer must only offer an alternative that reasonably accommodates the employee’s religious needs.

Plaintiffs contended that the school districts’ proposed accommodation of weekly testing was not sufficient as it violated their “moral consciences.” While noting that a religious objection can have both religious and non-religious terms, the Court held the Plaintiffs’ “moral conscience” objections failed to allege what religious belief or practice the testing would violate. In short, the Plaintiffs did not correlate their objections to weekly testing to any religious belief. Plaintiffs’ argument that they should be exempt from testing because not exempting them would result in differential treatment (i.e., suspension without pay, dismissal, and resignation), thereby violating their religious beliefs, also had no merit. Such a ruling would allow an employee to reject any accommodation that would result in the employee being treated differently than other employees, which is not supported in the law.

Finally, the Court held that even if Plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient religious belief which was violated, the claim would still fail because the requested accommodation of not vaccinating or testing weekly would require the schools to violate the terms of the Executive Order. Violating the Executive Order, the court found, constituted an undue burden on the employer schools.

Print this page